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Between Friday (3 May 2019) and Sunday (5 May 2019) violence erupted again
between Israel and the Palestinians led by governing Hamas in the Gaza Strip. In
the course of a severe exchange of violence between the two conflict parties, the
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted a physical attack countering an offensive
cyber operation by Hamas. According to IDF, the air strike was conducted against
the Hamas Cyber Headquarter and a reaction to a cyber operation. Some accounts
took this information up and claimed a precedent, arguing that it was the first time a
nation reacted to an ongoing cyber operation with a physical strike. In the following I
will discuss some of the relevant questions of the law of armed conflict (LOAC) and
show that the airstrike does not constitute a legally relevant precedent.
Applicability of Law of Armed Conflict
International humanitarian law and/or LOAC is applicable in international and/
or non-international armed conflicts (common Art. 2 GC I-IV, Art. 1 (3), (4) AP I–
int. armed conflict; and Art. 3 GC I-IV, Art. 1 AP II– non-int. armed conflict). Both
legal frameworks have nearly identical basic sets of rules, which are accepted as
customary international law. At least the cardinal principles of humanitarian law – the
principle of distinction and the prohibition to cause unnecessary suffering – are in
common.
Without prejudice about the legal status of the Gaza Strip the applicability of the
LOAC requires an armed conflict. According to the definition of an armed conflict by
the ICTY the exchange of rockets, artillery fire and the air strikes between the conflict
parties constitute protracted armed violence between governmental authorities
of Israel and the Hamas as organized armed group – OAG. Besides the highly
controversial topic of ‘Palestine’ as a State, the Gaza Strip and the governing Hamas
predominantly are not considered as a State on their own. Thus, the conflict most
likely is non-international. In any case the conflict amounted to the necessary level
for the applicability of LOAC and the cardinal principles.
Applicable Rules to Airstrikes
Besides the rules of the weapons law, meaning the rules that prohibit certain types of
weapons and their effects, compare Art. 35 (2) AP I, Art. 51 (4) lit. b and c AP I and
Art. 35 (3) AP I the legality of airstrikes is governed by the so called ‘targeting law‘.
The term refers to the set of rules which regulate attacks directed at a certain target.
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Art. 57 AP I contains a paradigmatic targeting process in accordance with LOAC.
Inter alia the following rules have to be respected concerning airstrikes.
Attacks on targets in an area where civilians live, in particular, have to respect the
principle of distinction. The principle obliges to differentiate between civilians and
combatants, civilian objects and military objectives, thus, between unlawful and
lawful targets (Art. 48, 51 and 52 AP I).
According to Art. 51 (3) AP I civilians shall be protected and attacks may not be
directed at them, unless and for such time as they directly take part in hostilities
(the Direct Participation in Hostilities Rule or ‘DPH-Rule’). Civilians which directly
participate in hostilities become a lawful target for the duration of their participation.
When they fulfill a continuous combat function this loss is retained. Members of
OAGs generally are assumed to have a continuous combat function and may be
attacked at all times just the same as regular combatants (compare the ICRCs DPH
study).
Likewise, originally civilian objects that are used for military purposes can be
attacked. On the other side it is prohibited to hide military targets between civilians,
in civilian objects (Art. 58 AP I) and to use civilians as protective shields against
attacks (Art. 51 (7)AP I). It constitutes a violation of LOAC if protected areas or
objects like hospitals, mosques, schools (…) are abused for military gains as in Art.
51 (7), 54 (3), 58 AP I.
Before and during the attack certain precautions have to be taken. Especially in
inhabited areas warnings should be issued before an attack, see Art. 57 AP I.
Finally attacks are prohibited if they may be expected to cause incidental loss
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects (…), which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, see
Art. 57 (2) (a) (iii) AP I. Therefore, parties of a conflict are obliged to use a minimum
of force in civilian surroundings.
The Airstrike against HamasCyberHQ
Concerning the airstrikes from the 5thof May there is no information about the
weapons used by the IDF, neither are there confirmed information about the specific
content, course and effects of the Hamas cyber operations. Thus, solely targeting
law can be evaluated here.
The airstrikes have been conducted against a building in the Gaza Strip, which is a
densely populated area. Hence, LOAC obliges to use special care and a minimum of
force if attacks are conducted in such civilian surroundings. The IDF air force claims
to use smart bombs and precision-guided munition (PGM) in airstrikes.
Hamas and its Members under LOAC
If Hamas is seen as government of a State, the members of their armed groups
are considered as combatants. An attack on them would be lawful, provided the
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aforementioned other rules are complied with. If they are seen as an OAG, their
armed members become lawful targets due to their continuous combat function, see
Art. 51 (3) AP I.
Other Hamas members who do not carry out a combat function – as the organization
has political components, too – possibly may be classified as civilians. However,
the organization has a military or paramilitary background. It is therefore hard to
distinguish political members from the ones who are part of the armed groups. When
a person originally classified as civilian takes up a weapon and gets involved in the
fighting, it becomes a lawful target due to Art. 51 (3) AP I. De minimis members with
military or semi-military function are seen as lawful targets either due to Art. 43 (2),
48 AP I or due to Art. 51 (3) AP I.
The known problems and discussions concerning the criteria and thresholds of the
DPH rule are raised by the status of Hamas members. What about persons who
fulfill supply, governance or executive functions? The fine line between lawful targets
and protected civilians is blurred on various occasions.
The Case of the HamasCyberHQ
To the extent known, the building which was the object of the airstrike was located
in a civilian area. If the nature or purpose of the object does not make an effective
contribution to military action, it shall be presumed to be used for civilian purposes
as a rule of doubt (Art.52 (2), (3) AP I). Therefore, the nature and purpose of the
HamasCyberHQ is decisive for the lawfulness of the strike. This depends on the
actual contribution to military action and, thus, on the purpose and function by the
personal residing there. In addition, the functions and activities of the personal
determine their legal status. If they have to be qualified as protected persons, this
might constitute a reason for the unlawfulness of the strike in connection with the
proportionality rule.
Provided the building was a base for the intelligence branch and the
HamasCyberHQ, their functions must have contributed to the military activities. The
intelligence branch regularly serves not only internal purposes but external, cross-
border purposes. With a view to the continuously ongoing conflict with regular armed
clashes with Israel, it is highly likely that it includes a military component. The military
intelligence branch gains military advantage for Hamas when military intelligence is
gathered about Israel. Due to this function it becomes a military object. Therefore, an
attack against the intelligence service offers a military advantage and is lawful, see
Art. 51, 52 AP I.
Cyber Operatives
Concerning cyber operations, the capability and functions of the cyber operatives
have to be analyzed. If they conduct harmful cyber operations which can cause
physical effects and destruction, especially if they can affect Israeli military
operations, the cyber operatives do not have to be treated different than regular
participants in armed operations. An example might be a cyber operation that
interferes with military communication of the opponent.
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Persons linked to an OAG, who are able to affect military operations of another
conflict party, execute military functions. Cyber operatives tasked accordingly,
have to be classified likewise. If they are affiliated with an OAG, they clearly have
a continuous combat function. If they are not a member or part of an OAG and
they perform their operations as civilians, they nevertheless directly participate in
hostilities. It does not matter whether the personal in question solely works on a
computer in distance to the ‘real’ fighting, as long as they contribute to the military
efforts of a party to the conflict. Hereto the type, the function and the (intended or
possible) effects of the cyber operation become decisive for the legal status.
Cyber Operations
As cyber operations can have various functions and often are ‘dual-use’ the
distinction becomes more problematic. Many grey zones or at least close single
cases arise as a ‘civilian’ DDOS attack (= Distributed Denial of Service Attack) can
have an effect on a military operation. Thus, the lowest threshold with view to LOAC
and in connection to the ongoing armed conflict has to be identified: This is any
cyber operation that fosters the military operation, helps it to be more effective and
consequently provides a military advantage. The cyber operation always has to be
compared to conventional operations and non-sufficient support operations.
Inter alia DDOS attacks, the infiltration of military or governmental networks
and computers with military (guidance) connection, the change of military or
governmental data and the interference with signals can be qualified as a military
advantage towards the other party. Besides information operations like publishing
or otherwise spreading misleading information for enemy forces create military gain.
Also a misinformation about the military status of a civilian object, which additionally
leads to an abuse of the civilian protection status, constitutes another violation of Art.
51 AP I.
In conclusion, the lawfulness of the attack on the HamasCyberHQ depends on the
single facts of the case and thereby on the type of the conducted cyber operation(s).
In case the cyber operatives have or had conducted a cyber operation against Israel
as claimed by the IDF, it is not farfetched that the operation was intended to create
relevant military gain for Hamas. An attack against the cyber operatives therefore
would have been lawful with view to the status of the HamasCyberHQ. Nevertheless,
this can only be determined in the end if some ‘hard’ facts of the defended cyber
operation are published. The same is true for other legal requirements of the airstrike
like the proportionality rule and the duty to precautions. These cannot be assessed
without further information.
Prospects of Cyber Operations under LOAC
The incidents of the first weekend of May 2019 again demonstrate how fast the
conflict between Israel and Hamas can escalate. It also shows that both parties
are ready and willing to use all available tools to defeat the other party. The open
statement on a cyber operation against Israel, its defense by the IDF and the thereby
justified conventional airstrike on the HamasCyberHQ present a variety of legal
issues from LOAC perspective. Most of these questions derive from already existing
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legal discussions about the content and interpretation of LOAC. Nonetheless, the
peculiarities of the conduct of cyber operations, their functions and their effects lead
to new grey zones.  There is an urgent need for further clarification by States on
their interpretation and categorization of cyber operations to prevent an escalation
of violence in reaction to cyber operations. In the present case on the basis of the
available information a violation of LOAC has probably not taken place. However, if
not in this case – the next airstrike against cyber operatives in a populated area can
cause civilian victims and violate LOAC.
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